bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 24 May 2017 13:56:05 +0000 (14:56 +0100)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Thu, 17 Jan 2019 18:56:17 +0000 (18:56 +0000)
commitd395c86b593313e3c1f719ea88cc0dd89ebee7b6
tree0d432fb27473a6a6de1121f86230475956f7e6d4
parent9a78f02d60d38e145c670e10cee56d881d1cdfc8
bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down

There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk.  These allow
private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
restriction.

Completely prohibit the use of BPF when the kernel is locked down.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
[bwh: Adjust context to apply after commit dcab51f19b29
 "bpf: Expose check_uarg_tail_zero()"]

Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all/lockdown
Gbp-Pq: Name 0027-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch
kernel/bpf/syscall.c